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Abstract—We study a novel class of mechanism design
problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the
payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems
captures many common economic situations, and yet it has
not been studied, to our knowledge, in the past. We focus
on the case of procurement auctions in which sellers have
private costs, and the auctioneer aims to maximize a utility
function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the
sum of the payments provided by the mechanism does
not exceed a given budget. Standard mechanism design
ideas such as the VCG mechanism and its variants are not
applicable here. We show that, for general functions, the
budget constraint can render mechanisms arbitrarily bad
in terms of the utility of the buyer. However, our main
result shows that for the important class of submodular
functions, a bounded approximation ratio is achievable.
Better approximation results are obtained for subclasses
of the submodular functions. We explore the space of
budget feasible mechanisms in other domains and give a
characterization under more restricted conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following familiar problems:
• Knapsack: Given a budget B and a set of items
N = {1, . . . , n}, each with cost ci and value vi,
find a subset of items S which maximizes
∑
i∈S vi
under the budget constraint.
• Matching: Given a budget B and a bipartite graph,
with set of edges N = {e1, . . . , en} each with cost
ce and value ve, find a legal matching S which
maximizes
∑
e∈S ve under the budget constraint.
• Coverage: Given a budget B and subsets N =
{T1, . . . , Tn} of some ground set, each with a cost
ci find a subset S which maximizes |∪i∈STi| under
the budget constraint.
Three much studied, and much solved, optimization
problems. However, suppose that the elements of N
are not combinatorial objects, but strategic agents with
private costs. The above problems then capture natural
economic interactions: Knapsack, for example, models a
simple procurement auction, while Coverage may model
the problem of maximizing exposure of an advertising
campaign under a budget. These are precisely the kinds
of economic interactions we wish to study here: reverse
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auctions with private costs, with the goal of optimizing
the auctioneer’s value.
At first glance it may seem that the problem we
describe falls within the scope of familiar domains.
However, closer inspection reveals a new dimension of
difficulty: the budget constraint applies not to the costs
but to the payments the mechanism uses to support
truthfulness. We need mechanisms whose sum of
payments never exceeds the given budget.
Can we design mechanisms that implement
these intended economic interactions in the most
favorable way to the auctioneer without their
payments exceeding the budget?
Mechanism design is by now a very mature disci-
pline and the recent injection of computational thought
has helped develop it even further, and in new and
forward-looking directions [24]. Procurement auctions,
introduced to computer scientists already in [24], were
at first studied under utilitarian objectives, seeking to
optimize social welfare [24], [12]. More recently pro-
curement auctions have been studied under the non-
utilitarian framework of frugality [8], [3], [15], [11], [26]
— essentially, payment optimization in reverse auctions.
These situations still fall within classical mechanism
design theory, where the set of possible outcomes is a
priori fixed and publicly known. By “set of all possible
outcomes” here we mean the set of all possible alloca-
tions, with payments projected out. In other words, there
is a rich class of allocations, independent of payments,
each of which is realizable by a truthful mechanism.
In the three introductory examples, however, the set of
possible outcomes is not fixed or publicly known: It
depends crucially on the participants’ private informa-
tion, ultimately on the mechanism’s payments. It is this
peculiarity that makes these three problems difficult, and
places them at a blind spot of mechanism design.
Budget Feasible Mechanisms
We say a truthful mechanism is budget feasible if
its payments do not exceed a given budget. In single
parameter domains, where each agent’s private informa-
tion is a single number, designing truthful mechanisms
often reduces to designing monotone allocation rules,
since payments can be computed via binary search [21].
This no longer holds when the payments are restricted
by a budget: Designing a budget feasible allocation
rule requires understanding its payments, which in-turn
depend on the allocation rule itself. Not surprisingly, it
seems that budget feasible mechanisms are very tricky
to find.
The VCG mechanism does not work: Consider a
simple Knapsack instance where all items have identical
values, and except for one item whose cost equals the
budget, all items have small costs. The VCG mechanism
will choose the n − 1 small-cost agents, paying the
budget to each. Thus, while this mechanism returns the
optimal solution with total cost within the budget, the
total payment will be way over budget (in fact, (n− 1)
times the budget).
In general, nothing can work: Consider a slight
variation of the above problem, in which all items have
small costs, and identical values as long as a particular
item i is in the solution, and otherwise all have value 0
(for example, think of i as a corkscrew and the rest of the
items as bottles of wine). How well can a budget feasible
mechanism do here? If the mechanism has a bounded
approximation ratio it must always guarantee to include
i in its solution. This however implies that as long as i
declares a cost that is less than the mechanism’s budget,
the mechanism includes her in the solution. A truthful
mechanism must therefore surrender its entire budget to
i. This of course results in an unbounded approximation
ratio.
Our Results
The question, then, is: Which classes of functions have
budget feasible mechanisms with good approximation
properties? Our main result is a randomized constant
factor budget feasible mechanism that is universally
truthful for the quite general, and important, class of
nondecreasing submodular functions (Theorem 4.8).
For a slightly broader class, that of fractionally subad-
ditive functions, we show that computational constraints
dictate a lower bound. As shown in the simple exam-
ple above, superadditive functions bring out the clash
between truthfulness and the budget constraint. On a
positive note, the three problems in the beginning of
the section correspond to subclasses (additive, OXS, and
coverage) of submodular maximization problems. We
show improved approximations for these problems and
other special cases. We further explore the space of
budget feasible mechanisms, showing several impossibil-
ities as well as a characterization under more restricted
conditions.
Related Work
Budgets in auctions: Budgets came under scrutiny
in auction theory [9], [7], [13], [6] after observing
behavior of bidders in online automated auctions [2], as
well as in spectrum auctions where bidding is performed
by groups of strategic experts [7]. While these pioneering
works highlight the significance and challenges that
budgets introduce to mechanism design, they relate to
an entirely different concept than the one we study
here. While these works study the impact of budgets on
strategic bidders, our interest is to explore the budget’s
effect on the mechanism. These papers, however, do
point out the complexity induced by budget constraints
in mechanism design, and the need for approximations.
Frugality: In recent years a theory of frugality
has been developed with the goal of providing mech-
anisms for procurement auctions that admit minimal
payments [8], [3], [15], [11], [26] . Budget feasibility
and frugality are complementary concepts. Frugality is
about buying a feasible solution at minimum cost —
there are no preferences among the solutions, and the
goal is to minimize payments. In our setting we have
no preferences among payments — as long as they are
below the budget — but we do care about the value of
the solutions. The two approaches are complementary
also in another important sense: in our last section we
show that for all the problems studied in the frugality
literature there are no budget feasible mechanisms.
Cost Sharing: Somewhat conceptually closer to our
work is the subject of cost sharing, in which agents have
private values for a service, there is a nondecreasing cost
for allocating the service to agents, and the goal is to
maximize the agents’ valuations under the cost (see [14]
for a survey). The proportional share mechanism we
study in this paper is inspired by [20] and [25]. The
relationship between cost sharing and our setting, how-
ever, is quite limited: we are not aiming to optimize a
function of the agents private information under a public
cost function, but rather optimize a public function under
constraints dictated by agents’ private information and a
fixed budget. Here, our goal is non-utilitarian — we aim
to maximize the buyer’s demand, which is independent
of the agents’ utilities.
Submodular Maximization: From a pure algorith-
mic perspective, even under a cardinality constraint,
maximizing a submodular function is well known to
be NP-hard, and an 1 − 1/e approximation ratio can
be achieved by greedily taking items based on their
marginal contribution [23]. When items have costs, vari-
ations of greedy on marginal contribution normalized
by cost can achieve constant factor approximations, and
even the optimal 1−1/e ratio [16], [17]. For submodular
maximization problems that can be expressed as integer
programs, rounding solutions of linear and nonlinear pro-
grams can, in some cases, achieve the optimal constant
approximation ratio [1].
Paper Organization
After the necessary definitions in Section II, we
present a mechanism for the class of symmetric submod-
ular functions (Section III); this special case simplifies
the problem enormously and facilitates the introduction
of ideas and intuition for the general submodular case.
Our main result for submodular functions is developed
in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we further discuss
the space of budget feasibility, improved approximations,
impossibility results and characterization.
II. THE MODEL
In a budget-limited reverse auction we have a set of
items [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and a single buyer. Each item
i ∈ [n] is associated with a cost ci ∈ R+, while the
buyer has a budget B ∈ R+ and a demand valuation
function V : 2[n] → R+. In the full information case,
costs are common knowledge, and the objective is to
maximize the demand function under the budget, i.e. find
the subset S ∈ {T |∑i∈T ci ≤ B} for which V (S) is
maximized.
We focus on the strategic case, in which each item
is held by a unique agent and costs are private. The
budget and demand function of the buyer are common
knowledge. A solution is a subset and a payment vector,
and the objective is to maximize the demand function
while the payments (not costs) are within the budget.
More formally, a mechanism M = (f, p) consists of
an allocation function f : Rn+ → 2[n] and a payment
function p : Rn+ →Rn+. The allocation function f maps
a set of n bids to a subset S = f(c1, . . . , cn) ⊆ [n].
The payment function p returns a vector p1, . . . , pn
of payments to the agents. We shall often omit the
arguments c1, . . . , cn when writing f and p. We shall
denote by s1, . . . , sn the characteristic vector of S, that
is, si = 1 iff i ∈ S. As usual, we seek normalized
(si = 0 implies pi = 0), individually rational (pi ≥ si·ci)
mechanisms with no positive transfers (pi ≥ 0). As it is
common in algorithmic mechanism design, our goal is
manifold. We seek mechanisms that are:
1) Truthful, that is, reporting the true costs is a dom-
inant strategy for sellers. Formally, a mechanism
M = (f, p) is truthful (incentive compatible) if for
every i ∈ [n] with cost ci and bid c′i, and every set
of bids by [n]\{i} we have pi−si ·ci ≥ p′i−s′i ·ci,
where (si, pi) and (s′i, p′i) are the allocations and
payments when the bidding is ci and c′i, respec-
tively. A mechanism that is a randomization over
truthful mechanisms is universally truthful.
2) Computationally Efficient. The functions f and
p can be computed in polynomial time. In cases
where the demand function requires exponential
data to be represented (as in the general sub-
modular case), we take the common “black-box”
approach and assume the buyer has access to an
oracle which allows evaluating any subset S ⊆ [n],
with polynomially many queries. Such queries are
known as value queries. This is a weaker model
than ones allowing demand or general queries
(see [5] for a definition). Since our main interest
here is algorithmic, this strengthens our results.
3) Budget Feasible. Importantly, we require that a
mechanism’s allocation rule and payments do not
exceed the budget:
∑
i pisi ≤ B. We call such
mechanisms budget feasible.
4) Approximation. We want the allocated subset to
yield the highest possible value for the buyer. For
α ≥ 1 we say that a mechanism is α-approximate
if the mechanism allocates to a set S such that
OPT (c,N , B) ≤ αV (S), where OPT (c,N , B)
denotes the value of full information optimal solu-
tion over a set of agents N with cost vector c and
budget B. As usual, when dealing with randomiza-
tion we seek mechanisms that yield constant factor
approximations in expectation.
This is a single parameter mechanism design
problem, in that each bidder has only one private value.
We shall repeatedly rely on Myerson’s well-known
characterization 1:
Theorem 2.1 ([22]): In single parameter domains a
normalized mechanism M = (f, p) is truthful iff:
(i) f is monotone: ∀i ∈ [n], if c′i ≤ ci then i ∈
f(ci, c−i) implies i ∈ f(c′i, c−i) for every c−i;
(ii) winners are paid threshold payments: payment
to each winning bidder is inf {ci : i /∈ f(ci, c−i)}.
III. SYMMETRIC SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS
We now introduce a subclass of submodular functions
which is devoid of many of the intricacies of the general
case. It will serve as an exposition of the basic ideas, and
will help understand the difficulties in the general case.
We say a set function is symmetric if it only depends
on the cardinality of the set, rather than the identity
of the items it holds. Symmetric submodular functions
(also called downward sloping) were used by Vickrey
in his seminal work on multi-unit auctions [27]. They
have a very simple structure:
1Note that although there is a budget constraint on the payments,
Myerson’s characterization applies to our setting as well. Due to
the characterization, we know that the allocation rule determines the
payment function. The budget constraint can therefore be viewed as a
property of the allocation rule alone.
Definition 3.1: A function V : 2[n] → R+ is sym-
metric submodular if there exist r1 ≥ . . . ≥ rn ≥ 0,
such that V (S) =
∑|S|
i=1 ri.
Consider the following allocation rule fM: Sort the
n bids so that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn, and consider the
largest k such that ck ≤ B/k. That is, k is the place
where the curve of the increasing costs intersects the
hyperbola B/k. The set allocated here is {1, 2, . . . , k}.
That is, fM = {1, 2, . . . , k}. This is obviously a mono-
tone allocation rule: an agent cannot be excluded when
decreasing her bid. In the Appendix we show that paying
each agent θi = min{B/k, ck+1} results in a truthful
mechanism.2
Observe that this allocation rule has the property
we seek: summing over the payments that support
truthfulness satisfies the budget constraint. Hence this
gives us a budget feasible mechanism. Importantly, this
is also a good approximation of the optimum solution:
Theorem 3.2: The above mechanism has approxima-
tion ratio of two.
Proof: Observe that the optimal solution is obtained
by greedily choosing the lowest-priced items until the
budget is exhausted. By the downward sloping property,
to prove the result it suffices to show that the mechanism
returns at least half of the items in the greedy solution.
Assume for purpose of contradiction that the optimum
solution has ℓ items, and the mechanism returns less than
ℓ/2. It follows that c⌈ℓ/2⌉ > 2B/ℓ. Note however, that
this is impossible since we assume that c⌈ℓ/2⌉ ≤ . . . ≤
cℓ, and
∑ℓ
i=⌈ℓ/2⌉ ci ≤ B which implies that c⌈ℓ/2⌉ ≤
2B/ℓ, a contradiction.
In Section V we show that no better approximation
ratio is possible. This is rather surprising, given the
simplicity of the full-information problem, and illustrates
the intricacies of budget feasibility.
IV. GENERAL SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS
We now turn to the general case of nondecreasing
submodular functions. A demand function V is
nondecreasing if S ⊆ T implies V (S) ≤ V (T ).
Definition 4.1: V : 2[n] → R+ is submodular if
V (S ∪{i})−V (S) ≥ V (T ∪{i})−V (T ) ∀S ⊆ T.
In general, submodular functions may require expo-
nential data to be represented. We therefore assume the
buyer has access to a value oracle which given a query
S ⊆ [n] returns V (S) (see related work section for more
2It is rather interesting that the second term is needed; we show in
the Appendix that the mechanism breaks down in its absence.
discussion on submodular maximization). In designing
truthful mechanisms for submodular maximization prob-
lems, the greedy approach is a natural fit, since it is
monotone when agents are sorted according to their
increasing marginal contributions relative to cost: the
marginal contribution of an agent i given a subset S is
Vi|S := V (S∪{i})−V (S). In the marginal contribution-
per-cost sorting the i + 1 agent is the agent j for
which Vj|Si/cj is maximized over all agents N where
Si = {1, 2 . . . , i}, and S0 = ∅. To simplify notation
we will write Vi instead of Vi|Si−1 . This sorting, in the
presence of submodularity, implies:
V1/c1 ≥ V2/c2 ≥ . . . ≥ Vn/cn. (1)
Notice that V (Sk) =
∑
i≤k Vi for all k.
A. The Proportional Share Allocation Rule
The mechanism from the previous section for the
limited symmetric case can be generalized appropriately
to work for various classes in the submodular family of
functions.
Definition 4.2: For a budget B and set of agents N
with cost vector c, the generalized proportional share al-
location rule, denoted fM(c, B,N ) sorts agents accord-
ing to (1) with costs vector c and budget B and allocates
to agents {1, . . . , k} that respect ci ≤ B · Vi/V (Si).
Observe that this condition is met for every {1, . . . , i}
when i ≤ k.
For concreteness consider the case of additive valu-
ations (Knapsack from the Introduction): each agent is
associated with a fixed value vi and V (S) =
∑
i∈S vi.
Here the marginal contribution of each agent is indepen-
dent of their place in the sorting, and we simply have that
Vi = vi for all agents i ∈ [n]. In this case fM produces
a budget-feasible mechanism. The reason is, it assures
us that for each agent i, the threshold payments of fM,
denoted θi do not exceed the agent’s proportional share:
θ′i = min
{ Vi · B∑
i∈S Vi
,
Vi · ck+1
Vk+1
}
.
which allows budget feasibility, as well as individually
rationality: θ′i ≤ ci. This seems to make the propor-
tional share allocation rule an ideal candidate to obtain
budget feasible mechanisms. Indeed, with some minor
adjustments, for many problems with functions in the
submodular class (e.g. symmetric, Knapsack, Match-
ing,) this general approach works well and produces
budget feasible mechanisms with good approximation
guarantees (see the following section for more details).
Furthermore, as we discussed above, the proportional
share mechanism is optimal is some cases, and in some
restricted environments our characterizations show that
this is essentially the only budget feasible mechanism
(see the following section). It seems however that this
natural approach completely fails as soon as we en-
counter more involved cases, such as Coverage.
B. The Difficulties
The Coverage problem captures many of the difficul-
ties that are associated with designing budget feasible
mechanisms for the general submodular case. In Cover-
age the marginal contribution of an agent is not fixed,
but depends on the subset allocated by the algorithm
in the previous stages. An agent’s marginal contribution
therefore depends on its position in the sorting, which
introduces several difficulties.
Marginal Contributions are Affected by Costs:
When applying the proportional share mechanism in
Coverage, paying agents θ′i as above will be under the
budget, as we desire. However, observe that for each
agent i the payment depends on the marginal contri-
bution Vi, which is determined by i’s position in the
sorting. Thus, in such a case the payments will depend
on the agent’s declared cost, and therefore cannot induce
truthfulness, making the proportional share mechanism
hopeless here.
Simple allocation and payment schemes that are in-
dependent of the agent’s position in the sorting also
fail. An approach that may seem natural is to replace
marginal contributions with Shapley values [14] since
they make the proportional contribution of an allocated
agent independent of her position in the sorting. Unfortu-
nately, such an approach cannot approximate better than
a factor of
√
n, as we show in the full version of this
paper. While it is tempting to get rid of the marginal
contribution sorting, it is the only known means for
obtaining good approximation guarantees for the general
submodular case.
Non-monotonicity of the Maximum Operator:
Bounded approximation ratios for submodular maxi-
mization under a knapsack constraint depend crucially
on the ability to take the maximum between a greedy
solution and the item with highest value. In the general
case, as well in the case of Coverage, taking this max-
imum does not preserve monotonicity: simple examples
show that for allocation rules that depend on marginal
contribution sorting, by decreasing her cost an agent can
decrease the value of the allocation.
C. Overview of Our Approach
Our approach is based in three ideas:
• First, we derive an alternative characterization of
the threshold payments of the proportional share
allocation rule. Since we know that this rule does
not work, this may seem futile. We’ll show that
this characterization plays a significant role in our
design.
• Using the above characterization, we show that
for any (nondecreasing) submodular function, the
threshold payments of a slightly modified version
of the proportional share allocation rule are “not
too far” from the agents’ proportional contributions.
This enables us to guarantee that when running the
modified version of the proportional share alloca-
tion rule with a constant fraction of the budget, the
threshold payments will be budget feasible.
• Finally, to obtain the approximation guarantee we
partition the agents in a manner that allows us to
include the variation of the proportional share rule
over a subset of agents and obtain good approxima-
tion guarantees.
D. Characterizing Threshold Payments
The following definition is key in our characterization.
Definition 4.3: The marginal contribution of agent i at
point j is Vi(j) := V (Tj−1 ∪ {i})− V (Tj−1) where Tj
denotes the subset of the first j agents in the marginal-
contribution-per-cost sorting (as in (1)) over the subset
N \ {i}.
The intuition behind the payments characterization
can be described as follows. Consider running the
proportional share mechanism without agent i. For
the first j agents in the marginal contribution sorting,
using the marginal contribution of i at point j we can
find the maximal cost that agent i can declare in order
to be allocated instead of the agent in the jth place
in the sorting. While these costs may have arbitrary
behavior as a function of j, we will show that taking
the maximum of these values guarantees payments that
support truthfulness. To avoid confusion we use Tj to
denote the first j agents according to this sorting, V ′j
to denote the marginal contribution of the jth agent
in this case, and k′ to denote the index of the last
agent j ∈ N \ {i} that respects cj ≤ V ′j · B/V (Tj).
For brevity we will write ci(j) := Vi(j) · cj/V ′j and
ρi(j) := Vi(j) · B/V (Tj−1 ∪ {i}).
Lemma 4.4 (Payments Characterization): The
threshold payment for fM is
θi = max
j∈[k′+1]
{
min{ci(j), ρi(j)}
}
.
Proof: To characterize the threshold payment for
agent i, relabel the agents according to the marginal-
contribution-per-cost sorting over the subset N \ {i}.
Consider fM as a sequential allocation rule: at each
stage j, the mechanism resorts the remaining agents
that have not yet been allocated according to marginal
contribution-per-cost sorting, and allocates to the first
agent in the sorting if she meets the condition cj ≤
V ′j ·B/V (Tj−1 ∪ {j}).
For a given stage j in this sequential allocation, we can
find the maximal cost agent i would have been able de-
clare and be allocated, if she had been considered by the
mechanism at this stage: The value ci(j) = Vi(j) · cj/V ′j
is the maximal cost i can declare which would place her
ahead of j in the sorting, and if this cost does not exceed
ρi(j) = B · V ′i(j)/V (Tj−1 ∪ {i}), the mechanism would
have allocated to agent i. Therefore, had i appeared
at stage j, the minimum between these values is the
maximal cost she can declare and be allocated at this
stage. Since Vi(j) monotonically decreases with j while
cj/V
′
j increases, ci(j) may have arbitrary behavior as
a function of j. However, as we now show, taking the
maximum of these values result in threshold payments.
Let r be the index in [k′ + 1] for which
min{ci(j), ρi(j)} is maximal. Declaring a cost below
θi ≤ ci(r) guarantees i to be within the first r ≤ k′ + 1
elements in the sorting stage of the mechanism, with r−1
items allocated. Since θi ≤ ρi(r), i will be allocated.
To see that declaring a higher cost prevents i from
being allocated, consider first the case where ci(r) ≤
ρi(r). A higher cost places i after r in the sorting stage
of the mechanism. If the maximum of ci(j) over all j ∈
[k′ + 1] is ci(r), reporting a higher cost places i after
an element which is not allocated and therefore it will
not be allocated. Otherwise, if ci(r) < ci(j), for some
j ≤ k′ + 1, by the maximality of r it must be the case
that:
B · Vi(j)
V (Tj−1 ∪ {i}) = ρi(j) < ci(r) < ci(j)
and i will not be allocated as a cost above ρi(j) will not
meet the allocation condition.
In the second case when ci(r) > ρi(r), if r is the
index which maximizes ρi(j) over all indices in [k′+1],
reporting a higher cost will not meet the mechanism’s
allocation condition at each index in [k′+1]. Otherwise,
if there is some other index j ∈ [k′ + 1] for which this
maximum is achieved, then:
Vi(j) · cj
V ′j
= ci(j) < ρi(r) < ρi(j)
and thus declaring a higher cost in this case places i after
j in the sorting, and the mechanism will not consider i.
Lemma 4.5 (Individual Rationality): The mechanism
fM is individually rational, i.e., ci ≤ θi.
Proof: Observe that:
(a) Vi(j) ≥ Vi(j+1) ∀j ∈ N ;
(b) Tj = Sj ∀j < i;
(c) Vi|Ti−1 = Vi.
Since the threshold payment is the maximum over
all min{ci(j), ρi(j)} in [k′ + 1], it is enough to show
that ci ≤ min{ci(j), ρi(j)} for a certain j ≤ k′ + 1.
Since (b) implies that i ≤ k′ + 1 we can consider
i’s replacement j which appears in the ith place in
the marginal-contribution-per-cost sorting over N \ {i}.
Since i ∈ [k], and due to (b) and (c) above, we have that
ci ≤ Vi · B
V ((Si−1 ∪ {i}) =
Vi|Ti−1 · B
V (Ti−1 ∪ {i}) = ci(j).
In the original sorting, i appears ahead of j (as implied
from (b)), and therefore its relative marginal contribution
is greater. Thus:
ci ≤
Vi|Si−1 · cj
Vj|Si−1
=
Vi|Ti−1 · cj
V ′j|Tj−1
= ρi(j).
It therefore follows that ci ≤ min{ci(j), ρi(j)} ≤ θi.
E. Payment Bounds
The characterization above allows us to include a
slightly modified version of the proportional share allo-
cation rule in our mechanism, with threshold payments
that are guaranteed to be no more than a constant factor
away from agents’ proportional contribution. This is a
key property which guides the design of our mechanism.
We will run the modified proportional share allocation
rule over a subset of the agents Ns, with a constant
fraction of the budget, denoted B′. We describe Ns
and B′ explicitly in the following section, but for
the purpose of showing the payment bounds, we
can think of these as any subset of agents and any
budget. In this modified version of the proportional
share allocation rule, for i∗s := argmaxj∈NsV ({j}),
we sort the agents of Ns \ {i∗s} according to the
marginal-contribution-per-cost order, and allocate to
W = Sk ∪ {i∗s}, where Sk are all k agents in Ns
that respect the condition ci ≤ Vi · B/V (Si ∪ {i∗s}).
The characterization from above easily extends to this
case using ρi(j) = Vi(j) · B/V (Tj−1 ∪ {i, i∗s}). Under
this modification we can show the following desirable
bound on the threshold payments:
Lemma 4.6 (Payment Bounds): For i ∈ W \ {i∗s}:
θi ≤
(6e− 2
e− 1
)Vi · B′
V (W )
.
Proof: For Tk′ as above, let W ′ = Tk′ ∪ {i∗s} and
let r be the index for which θi = min{ci(r), ρi(r)}. If
r ≤ k′, observe that the sorting implies cr/V ′r ≤ ck′/V ′k′
and therefore:
θi ≤
Vi(r) · cr
V ′r
≤ Vi(r) · ck′
V ′k′
≤ Vi(r) ·B
′
V (W ′)
≤ Vi ·B
′
V (W ′)
where the last inequality relies on the observation that
Vi(j) ≤ Vi for every j ∈ Ns \ {i∗s}, which is due to the
fact that Tj = Sj for j ≤ i and the decreasing marginal
utility property of V . In the case where if r = k′ + 1:
θi ≤ ρi(r) =
Vi(k′+1) · B′
V (W ′ ∪ {i}) ≤
Vi ·B′
V (W ′)
.
We therefore see that in both cases θi ≤ Vi · B′/V (W ′).
To complete our proof, we will show that V (W ) ≤
((5e− 1)/(e− 1))V (W ′).
Consider the marginal contribution-per-cost sorting on
Ns \ {i, i∗s} and let ℓ′ := max{t|
∑
j≤t cj ≤ B′}. Due
to the marginal contribution-per-cost sorting we have:
ck′+1
V ′k′+1
ℓ′∑
j=k′+1
V ′j ≤
ℓ′∑
j=k′+1
( cj
V ′j
)
V ′j ≤ B′.
Since ck′+1/V ′k′+1 > B/V (W ′∪{k′+1}), the above
inequality implies:
V (Tℓ′)− V (Tk′) < V (W ′ ∪ {k′ + 1})
and since Tk′ ⊂ W ′, and i∗s ∈ W ′ this implies
that 3V (W ′) ≥ V (Tℓ). From submodularity, it can be
shown that V (Tℓ+1) is a e/(e− 1)-approximation of the
optimal solution (over Ns \ {i, i∗s}) [16], [17]. Since
i∗s ∈W ′ we have that:
V (W ) ≤ OPT (c, B′,Ns)
≤ OPT (B′,Ns \ {i, i∗}) + V ({i}) + V ({i∗})
<
( 4e
e− 1 + 2
)
V (W ′)
which concludes our proof.
F. Approximation Guarantee
To obtain the approximation guarantee we partition the
set of agents based on their value and declared cost. Let
i∗ := argmaxi∈NV ({i}), Ns := {i 6= i∗ : ci ≤ B/2},
and Nℓ := N \ (Ns ∪ {i∗}). This partition, as we argue
later, does not break monotonicity. Our mechanism will
run the modified proportional share allocation rule over
Ns, with a constant fraction of the budget B/α.
The rational behind this approach is the following.
Due to their large cost, any feasible solution includes
at most one agent in Nℓ, and since each such agent
has value lower than that of i∗, we will be able to
discard Nℓ without sacrificing too much from the
quality of our solution. Since all the costs in Ns are
below B/2, including i∗s in our solution W is always
feasible. Importantly, we can show this allocation rule
is a constant factor approximation over Ns:
Lemma 4.7:
(
(3+2α)e−1
e−1
)
V (W ) ≥ OPT (c, B,Ns).
Sketch: Similarly to what we have shown in
lemma 4.6, one can show that
V (Sℓ)− V (Sk) < αV (W ∪ {k + 1})
where ℓ is the maximal index for which
∑
j≤ℓ cj ≤ B
when items are taken according to their marginal contri-
bution relative to cost on Ns\{i∗s}. Since W includes i∗s ,
one can verify that V (Sℓ+1) ≤ (2+2α)V (W ). Similar to
before, we know that (1− 1/e)OPT (c, B,Ns \ {i∗s}) ≤
V (Sℓ+1), and thus:
OPT (c, B,Ns) ≤ OPT (c, B,Ns \ {i∗s}) + V ({i∗s})
≤
((2 + 2α)e
e− 1 + 1
)
V (W )
which implies our desired bound.
G. Main Result
We can now prove our main theorem.
Theorem 4.8: For any submodular maximization
problem there exists a constant factor approximation
randomized mechanism in the value query model which
is budget feasible and universally truthful. Furthermore,
no budget feasible mechanism can do better than 2− ǫ,
for any fixed ǫ > 0.
Our analysis shows that in expectation our
mechanism guarantees an approximation ratio of(
58e2−32e+6
(e−1)2
)
≈ 117.7. It is possible that tighter
analysis can show the mechanism does better. We
further discuss this points in Section VI.
Proof: Consider the following mechanism:
A Budget Feasible Approximation Mechanism
for Submodular Functions
Initialize: i∗ ←− argmaxi∈NV ({i}),
Ns ←− {i 6= i∗ : ci ≤ B/2},
i∗s ←− argmaxi∈NsV ({i}),
W ←− {i∗s},
B′ ←−
(
(e− 1)/(12e− 4)
)
B,
i←− argmaxj∈Ns\{i∗s}V ({j})/cj
While ci ≤ Vi · B′/V (W ∪ {i})
Do: W ←−W ∪ {i}
i←− argmaxj∈N\{i∗s}Vj|Si/cj
Output: Choose u.a.r. from {(W, θˆ), ({i∗}, B)}
The payment θˆ here is θˆi∗s = B/2 and θˆi =
min{θi, B/2} for i 6= i∗s , where θi are the payments as
described for the modified proportional share allocation
rule, using the budget B′ = B/α, for α = (12e−4)/(e−
1). Observe that α is exactly twice the constant from the
bound in Lemma 4.6.
In case i∗ is allocated, B is clearly her threshold
payment. If W is allocated, from the characterization
lemma and the fact that Ns consists only of agents with
cost less than B/2, θˆ as described above are clearly
the threshold payments. One can verify the partition of
agents is monotone and since payments are bounded by
B/2 agents in Nℓ cannot benefit by misreporting their
cost.
Since the modified proportional share allocation rule
uses B′ = B/α as its budget, from lemma 4.6, we can
conclude that:
∑
i
θˆi ≤ B/2 + α
∑
i6=i∗s
Vi ·B′
V (W )
≤ B
and the mechanism is therefore truthful and budget
feasible. Individual rationality and monotonicity were
discussed above, and the lower bound as described in
the following section applies here as well.
Finally, let β = ((3 + 2α)/(e − 1))/(e − 1). From
Lemma 4.7 and the partition of agents we have:
OPT (c, B,N ) ≤ OPT (c, B,N \ Nℓ) + V ({i∗})
≤ OPT (c, B,Ns) + 2V ({i∗})
≤ βV (W ) + 2V ({i∗})
≤ (2 + β)max
{
V (W ), V ({i∗})
}
which gives us our desired approximation ratio.
V. THE SPACE OF BUDGET FEASIBLE MECHANISMS
In this section we address some natural questions that
arise when exploring budget feasible mechanisms. We
limit our discussion to deterministic mechanisms.
A. Lower Bounds and Improved Approximations
For special cases of submodular functions, specialized
techniques based on the main result yield better
approximation ratios:
Theorem 5.1: For Knapsack there is a budget feasible
5-approximation mechanism. For Matching there is a
budget feasible (5e−1e−1 )-approximation mechanism. For
either problem, no budget feasible mechanism can ap-
proximate within a factor better than 2− ǫ, for any fixed
ǫ > 0.
We defer the details of upper bound proofs to the
full version of the paper. We will now show a lower
bound that is independent of computational assumptions
and shows that no approximation ratio better than two
is possible. For our lower bound we’ll consider a very
simple function, V (S) = |S|. Observe that all the
functions in the submodular class we have discussed,
including symmetric submodular include this demand
valuation.
Proposition 5.2: For V (S) = |S|, no budget feasible
mechanism can guarantee an approximation of 2− ǫ, for
any ǫ > 0.
Proof: Suppose we have n items with costs c1 =
c2 = · · · = cn = B/2 + ǫ, for some positive ǫ < B/2.
Assume, for purpose of contradiction that f is a budget
feasible mechanism with approximation ratio better than
2. In particular, f has a finite approximation ratio and
must therefore allocate to at least one agent in this case.
W.l.o.g., assume f allocates to agent 1.
By monotonicity, agent 1 can reduce her cost to
c′1 = ǫ
′ < B/2 − ǫ and remain allocated. For this
cost vector, (c1, c−1), Myerson’s characterization implies
that the threshold payment for agent 1 should be at
least B/2 + ǫ, by individual rationality and budget
feasibility, f cannot allocate to any other agent. Observe
however that the optimal full information solution in
this case allocates to two agents which contradicts f ’s
approximation ratio guarantee.
B. Lower Bound on Fractionally Subadditive Functions
In light of the positive results for submodular
functions, our natural desire would be to extend the
main result to more general classes of problems. We
now show there is little hope in that, at least in the value
query model. Let us consider fractionally subadditive
functions:
Definition 5.3: A function V : 2[n] → R is called
fractionally subadditive if there exists a finite set of addi-
tive valuations {a1, . . . , at} s.t. V (S) = maxi∈[t]ai(S).
It is known that every submodular function can
be represented as a fractionally subadditive function,
and that all fractionally subadditive functions are
subadditive [18]. Using a simple reduction from [19]
we show that for mechanisms which use value query
oracles, obtaining reasonable approximations in the case
of fractionally subadditive demands is hard, regardless
of incentive considerations.
Theorem 5.4: In the case of fractionally subadditive
demands, any algorithm which approximates within a
factor better than n 12−ǫ, for any fixed ǫ > 0, requires
exponentially many value queries. This is true even in
the setting where all costs are public knowledge.
Proof: Our proof relies on the following lemma
shown in [19]. We will use vS to denote the additive
function that assigns the value 1 to an item j ∈ S
and 0 to all other items, and v to denote the function
that assigns a value (1+ǫ/2)/(n 12 ) to every item j ∈ [n].
Lemma 5.5 ([19]): There exists a set T , |T | = √n,
for which distinguishing between the functions V =
max{vS:|S|≤(1+ǫ/2)nǫ, v}, and V ′ = max{V, vT } re-
quires exponentially (in nǫ) many value queries.
Let c1 = c2, . . . , cn = 1 and B =
√
n. For such T as
in the lemma, we have that
∑
i∈T ci = B, and V ′(T ) =√
n while V (T ) = (1+ ǫ/2)nǫ. Thus, an algorithm that
approximates better than the desired approximation ratio
must be able to distinguish between these two valuations,
and requires exponentially many value queries.
C. Impossibility of Hiring a Team of Agents
Looking at problems previously studied in procure-
ment, one could also ask whether “hiring a team of
agents” problems [3], [26], [15], [8] have good budget
feasible mechanisms. In these problems there is a set of
feasible outcomes (e.g. all possible spanning trees or all
paths from s to t) and the goal is to design a mechanism
that yields a feasible solution. In the literature these
problems have been studied with the goal of designing
mechanisms which yield minimal payments (frugal),
according to various benchmarks.
In our notation, such problems can be written as
having a function V (S) = 1 if S ∈ F , and 0 otherwise,
where F is the set of all feasible outcomes. Call such
a problem nontrivial if all solutions in F contain more
than one element.
Theorem 5.6: There is no budget feasible mechanism
with a bounded approximation ratio for any nontrivial
“hiring a team of agents” problem.
Proof: Assume for purpose of contradiction, there
exists a budget feasible mechanism f that guarantees
a bounded approximation ratio. Let S be a feasible
outcome, and consider the bid profile in which all agents
in S declare positive cost ǫ < B/|S|, and all other
agents declare B. Since the problem is nontrivial, the
minimal cost of a feasible outcome different than S
(if it exists) exceeds the budget. Since f guarantees a
bounded approximation ratio, it must allocate to S. For
agent i ∈ S, consider the cost vector (c′i, c−i) with
c′i = B − ǫ(|S| − 1). Observe that S remains a cost-
feasible solution, and the only one in F , and therefore
f(c′i, c−i) = S, which implies the threshold payment of
agent i is at least c′i. Since this holds for all agents in
S, budget feasibility is contradicted.
D. Characterizing Budget Feasible Mechanisms in Re-
stricted Settings
The characterization of budget feasible mechanisms
with good approximation ratios naturally depends
on the environment in which the mechanisms are
implemented, or more concretely, the function we aim
to optimize. In characterizations, we often introduce
additional restrictions on our mechanisms which we
then use as guidelines in their design or for complete
characterization. We now consider mechanisms that
respect the two additional conditions of anonymity [4]
and weak stability (similar to [10]). Informally, a
mechanism is weakly stable if an agent doesn’t hurt
the rest when reducing her cost, and anonymous if its
allocation rule does not depend on the agents’ identities.
Definition 5.7: An allocation rule f satisfies
anonymity if i ∈ f(ci, cj , c−ij) implies
j ∈ f(c′i, c′j, c−ij) when c′i = cj , c′j = ci.
Definition 5.8: An allocation rule f satisfies weak
stability if for every i, j ∈ f(ci, c−i), c′i ≤ ci implies
j ∈ f(c′i, c−i).
Note that for the class of symmetric submodular
functions, the proportional share mechanism respects
these conditions. Furthermore, for symmetric submodu-
lar functions it seems quite reasonable that mechanisms
with good approximation properties satisfy these condi-
tions. The obvious question here is whether all budget
feasible mechanisms for the symmetric submodular case
take the form of the proportional share allocation rule.
Theorem 5.9: Let f be a budget feasible mechanism
that is anonymous and weakly stable, and let S = f(c)
for some bid profile c. Then, for all i ∈ S it must be
that ci ≤ B/|S|.
Proof: Assume for purpose of contradiction that
there is a bid profile c = (c1, . . . , cn), s.t. f(c) = S
and there is some i ∈ S for which ci > B/|S|. Let
c′ be the bid profile in which all agents in S \ {i} bid
cmin = minj∈S cj , and the rest bid as in c. Since f is
weakly stable, we have that S ⊆ f(c′). Let c′′ the bid
profile where i bids cmin as well, and the rest of the
agents bid as in c′. From monotonicity we have that i
is allocated, and again S ⊆ f(c′′). We now claim that
under the profile c′′, the threshold price for each agent
in S is at least ci > B/|S|. To see this, observe that i’s
threshold price must be at least ci, since i ∈ f(c′). Since
f is anonymous, and all agents in S declare the same
price, the threshold price for each agent in S must also
be at least ci. Thus, payments to agents in S exceed the
budget, contradicting budget feasibility.
VI. DISCUSSION
The space of budget feasible mechanisms seems quite
broad and invites for further investigation. The richness
of the submodular class implies there are many problems
for which better approximation ratios are achievable. We
have briefly discussed some specific examples which
include Knapsack, Matching, Coverage and the symmet-
ric submodular case, and believe there are many more
interesting problems to study. Furthermore, we believe a
better approximation ratio is achievable for the general
case, and it may be possible to improve the analysis of
the upper bound by showing tighter payment bounds.
While we have made a first step towards characteri-
zation by considering more restricted mechanisms, we
believe a much more general characterization for budget
feasible mechanisms awaits to be revealed. Finally, it
would be interesting to further explore the lower bounds
dictated by budget feasibility. Here we’ve shown several
lower bound which are independent of computational
assumptions, and it would be interesting to extend these
techniques.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank Christos Papadimitriou for
endless discussions and help. To Dave Buchfuhrer, Iftah
Gamzu, Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, George
Pierrakos, Amin Saberi, Michael Schapira, Meromit
Singer and Mukund Sundararajan the author wishes to
express gratitude for meaningful discussions and valu-
able advice.
REFERENCES
[1] Alexander A. Ageev and Maxim Sviridenko. Pipage rounding: A
new method of constructing algorithms with proven performance
guarantee. J. Comb. Optim., 8(3):307–328, 2004.
[2] Gagan Aggarwal, Nir Ailon, Florin Constantin, Eyal Even-
Dar, Jon Feldman, Gereon Frahling, Monika Rauch Henzinger,
S. Muthukrishnan, Noam Nisan, Martin Pa´l, Mark Sandler, and
Anastasios Sidiropoulos. Theory research at google. SIGACT
News, 39(2):10–28, 2008.
[3] Aaron Archer and ´Eva Tardos. Frugal path mechanisms. ACM
Transactions on Algorithms, 3(1), 2007.
[4] Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, and Ron Lavi. An optimal
lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. In ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 169–176, 2009.
[5] Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan. On the computational power of
iterative auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,
pages 29–43, 2005.
[6] Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mo-
hammad Mahdian, and Amin Saberi. Multi-unit auctions with
budget-constrained bidders. In ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, pages 44–51, 2005.
[7] Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, and Paul Milgrom. Winning play
in spectrum auctions. Working Paper.
[8] Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartline, and
Anna R. Karlin. Auctions for structured procurement. In SODA,
pages 304–313, 2008.
[9] Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, and Noam Nisan. Multi-unit
auctions with budget limits. In FOCS, pages 260–269, 2008.
[10] Shahar Dobzinski and Mukund Sundararajan. On characteri-
zations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and
scheduling. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages
38–47, 2008.
[11] Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, and Kenneth Steiglitz. Frugality in
path auctions. In SODA, pages 701–709, 2004.
[12] Joan Feigenbaum, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Rahul Sami, and
Scott Shenker. A bgp-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing.
In PODC, pages 173–182, 2002.
[13] Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pa´l, and Clifford Stein.
Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions. In
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 40–49, 2007.
[14] Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian. Cost sharing. In Noam
Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani,
editors, Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press,
2007.
[15] Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, and Tami Tamir. Beyond VCG:
Frugality of truthful mechanisms. In FOCS, pages 615–626,
2005.
[16] Samir Khuller, Anna Moss, and Joseph (Seffi) Naor. The bud-
geted maximum coverage problem. Inf. Process. Lett., 70(1):39–
45, 1999.
[17] Andreas Krause and Carlos Guestrin. A note on the budgeted
maximization of submodular functions. In CMU Technical
Report, pages CMU– CALD– 0 5 – 1 0 3, 2005.
[18] Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann, and Noam Nisan. Combi-
natorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. In ACM
conference on electronic commerce, 2001.
[19] Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, and Jan Vondra´k. Tight
information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization
in combinatorial auctions. In ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, pages 70–77, 2008.
[20] Herve´ Moulin and Scott Shenker. Strategyproof sharing of
submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency. Economic
Theory, 18(3), pages 511–533, 2001.
[21] Ahuva Mu’alem and Noam Nisan. Truthful approximation
mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. Games and
Economic Behavior, 64(2):612–631, 2008.
[22] R. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations
Research, 6(1), 1981.
[23] G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, and M. L. Fisher. An analysis
of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions ii.
Math. Programming Study 8, pages 73–87, 1978.
[24] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design.
Games and Economic Behaviour, 35:166 – 196, 2001. A
preliminary version appeared in STOC 1999.
[25] Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan. New trade-offs in
cost-sharing mechanisms. In STOC, pages 79–88, 2006.
[26] Kunal Talwar. The price of truth: Frugality in truthful mecha-
nisms. In STACS, pages 608–619, 2003.
[27] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive
sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16(1):8–37, 1961.
